INTRODUCTION
After seven years and intense, breathtaking negotiations of Hollywoodstyle epic proportions, a copyright law for the digital age was born. 1 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 2 (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 3 (WPPT) (collectively, the WIPO Internet Treaties) opened for signature in 1996 and entered into force in 2002, 4 officially ushering global copyright law into the information age. Both the WCT and WPPT formally acknowledged the "profound" impact of information and communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works, and on the production and use of performances and phonograms. The legal framework established was to facilitate "adequate solutions to questions raised by new economic, 4. For a treaty to enter into force means it has become binding between the parties that have ratified or acceded to it. Both treaties required thirty states to ratify or accede before they entered into force. See WPPT, supra note 3, art. 29; WCT, supra note 2, art. 21. The WCT entered into force on March 6, 2002; the WPPT followed suit on May 20, 2002. The WCT had seventy parties as of March 22, 2009 . WIPO, Contracting Parties-WCT, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang en&treaty-id=16 (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) [hereinafter WCT Contracting Parties] . As of the same date, the WPPT had sixtyeight signatories. WIPO, Contracting Parties-WPPT, http://www.wipo.int/ treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=20 (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). social, cultural and technological developments." 5 Less than a decade after becoming law, it is fair to say that the WIPO Internet Treaties are far less salient in the current policy and legal considerations about how knowledge creation might best be encouraged and sustained in the online context.
Like prior copyright treaties, the WCT and the WPPT pivot on the contested utilitarianism that defines modern international copyright law, namely, that proprietary incentives are a critical requirement for knowledge creation. 6 But digital technologies have disrupted long-settled canons of the classic copyright defense in at least some fundamental ways. 7 First, digital technologies have made it possible to overcome characteristic public goods limitations by perfecting authorial control over terms of access to creative works. As firmly established business models failed to capture rent through the full range of exploitation made possible by digital technologies, copyright owners sought a presumptive fiat over the architecture that made use and distribution over digital networks a pervasive feature of contemporary social interaction. Second, the phenomenon of social networking occasioned an acute shift in the cultural-turned-market realities confronting content proprietors. The rise of Web 2.0 illustrated clearly a truth muted by the regimented world of print works, namely, that robust creativity and corresponding economic success require users' ability to access and fully engage creative content across a spectrum of formats and devices. Given the unrestrained versatility of innovation in the digital arena, the WIPO Internet Treaties have fallen considerably short in what was to be their central mission, namely, to provide a relevant and credible source of norms to facilitate knowledge creation in the global digital context. This is not to say, however, that the WCT and the WPPT have not affected copyright law and doctrine in ways beyond what the participants imagined at the end of the diplomatic conference that yielded the substantive texts. 8 Academic commentary describing the perceived victories of the conference for copyright's age old balancing act between incentives and access led to euphoric headlines such as Africa 1 Hollywood 0,9 which hailed an outcome that many agreed recognized public-oriented considerations in the design of global copyright.' 0 In the midst of the 5. See WPPT, supra note 3, pmbl.; WCT, supra note 2, pmbl. 6. WCT, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 4. 7. See, e.g celebration over what did not happen in Geneva, given the ambitious agenda of copyright proprietors," I there was express acknowledgement that what hung in the balance was the future of consumer interaction with new digital technologies and, specifically, how copyright law would mold that future.1 2 Looking back now, it seems presumptuous to have arrogated such centripetal power to copyright doctrine when the treaties were intentionally far less concerned with enabling new modes of creative enterprise than preserving the existing presumptions in favor of authorial prerogative. 13 Given copyright's vintage history, seven years into this new digital copyright era may be too early to say with confidence that the future is here. But certainly, key features of that future have emerged and, in the view of many, remain troubling. Recent judicial decisions in the United States, however, also indicate a readiness to limit the role of the WIPO Internet Treaties in defining the conditions in which copyright owners may co-opt the digital world and constrain the use of knowledge goods online.
Part I of this essay briefly reviews the environment from which the WIPO Internet Treaties emerged, focusing in particular on the status of the treaties as special agreements under Article 20 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention).
14 I discuss how this designation foreshadowed some of the ensuing developments in international copyright law, specifically by extending a worn paradigm of copyright relations between authors and users that fails to account for the dynamic and iterative nature of the creative enterprise in the principles of U.S. copyright law than was the high-protectionist agenda that U.S. officials initially sought to promote in Geneva"); see also David Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties: Dateline: Geneva-December 1996, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (1997) ("It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. It was a far, far better copyright treaty than any the world had ever attempted before. It began with Great Expectations; by the end, the participants felt, if not quite like Les Mis&ables, at least as if they had emerged from a Bleak House.").
11. See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 370-71. 12. Id. at 372 (describing the negotiations as "a battle about the future of copyright in the global information society" (citing Mihfly Ficsor, Towards a Global Solution: The Digital Agenda of the Berne Protocol and the New Instrument, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 111, 118-22 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) ; Bruce Lehman, Intellectual Property and the National and Global Information Infrastructures, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 103, 103-09)); Browning, supra note 9, at 63 ("[The conference] did not give copyright holders many of the new legal powers they asked for-mostly because delegates feared that they would use those powers to force the future into the mold of the past, and so rob the Net of its potential to create change.").
13. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE § § 5. , available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf.
"During the preparatory work, an agreement emerged that the transmission of works on the Intemet and in similar networks should be the object of an exclusive right of authorization of the author or other copyright owner, with appropriate exceptions." Id. at 271.
14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 29, 1979, 25 digital age, including the significance of digital copyright rules on scientific research. 1
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Part II analyzes the new rights introduced by the WCT and evaluates their import for traditional copyright concerns. I suggest that, far from harmonizing copyright law with respect to rights in the digital arena, the WCT instead introduced a greater deference to national copyright laws that the Berne Convention had long sought to diminish with respect to traditional copyright. Although initially such deference produced national legislative outcomes that inordinately undermined knowledge creation and the corresponding public interest therein, there is a deepening and unrelenting call for global action, 16 and some positive national responses, 17 that could address the access and innovation deficit associated with an unbalanced international copyright regime. Part III briefly surveys domestic implementation of the WCT based on a WIPO study and explores how national trends in this regard fall short of addressing the spectrum of use attendant to digital works, information networks, and their relationship to the commercial success of new technologies. Finally, I question the role and expediency of participation by developing and least-developed countries (DCs & LDCs), whose agency was critical to the entry into force of the WIPO Internet Treaties. The regulation of creativity by the treaties in no way acknowledges the collaborative forms of creative engagement with which citizens in the global South have long identified, nor the cultural relativity of copyright's most enduring cannons. The social and legal recognition of new forms of creativity expressed through digital technologies offers an important opportunity to reconsider how international copyright law might accommodate a dynamic collage of incentives to support the innovative process across geographical, cultural, and technological boundaries. 18 17. See, e.g., Commission Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, at 3, 4-6, COM (2008) 466/3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/copyright/docs/ copyright-infso/greenpaper-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2009 ) (setting forth a number of issues connected with the role of copyright in the digital age in order to "foster a debate on how knowledge for research, science and education can best be disseminated in the online environment"). the meantime, however, for both developed countries and DCs/LDCs, sustainable creativity may require ongoing reliance on noncopyright regimes, such as consumer law, competition policy, and human rights. 19 Already, these regimes have attracted attention as mechanisms to secure the benefits and opportunities of access to and use of existing knowledge goods that once were left solely for copyright to bestow on her global audience.
I. TECHNOLOGY, AUTHORSHIP, AND CONSUMERISM

A. Copyright and Technology: Antecedents on the Road to Geneva
Technology and copyright have long shared an intimate relationship, and it is routine to describe copyright law as the product of technological change. 20 From the printed word to maps, charts, and functional objects that today comprise, for example, architectural works, 2 ' copyright has simultaneously mediated the relationship between authors and their works on the one hand, between users and copyrighted works on the other, and between the two inter se. In the classic copyright story, "authors" and "users" are protagonists who occupy distinct spaces and react to copyright differently. Accordingly, the law speaks to one or the other, but never to both simultaneously or with the same concerns. 22 Authors are to be Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 165, 170 (2008) (accentuating "the truism that culture is enriched as it is fed back for each of us autonomously to elaborate"). See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) ("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipmentthe printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection." (footnote omitted)); H.R. REP. No. 104-554, at 6 (1996) protected by copyright as the fountain of creative expression by which social welfare will be enhanced; users are to be at once benefited by having access to protected works, but also constrained by copyright to preserve the incentives that pervade the utilitarian scheme. For much of its history, then, a presumptive cloak woven from notions of an authorial process in which literary works emerge solely from the mind of a single person called an "author," rather than a "user," has hung heavily on the copyright frame and powerfully shaped considerations of copyright's allocation of proprietary rights. 23 The image of copyright law's audience as passive recipients and/or inert absorbers of content became the subject of increasing scholarly criticism 24 just as the emergence of digital technology revealed in concrete, practical terms the inadequacy of this conceptual framework. The consumer electronics revolution of the late 1980s, 25 which presaged the digital revolution, altered how consumers could access and experience creative works on a scale akin perhaps to how the printing press changed how owners could control access to and copying of literary works. By the late 1990s, the ubiquity of the Internet over the mundane and the sublime aspects of daily life engendered a symmetry between owners and users of digital works, concurrently empowering the capacity of both groups to reach markets with protected works in unprecedented fashion. Owners and consumers were equally disrupted from their settled expectations surrounding the production, distribution, and experience of the creative enterprise; 26 but, very quickly, owners seized upon the imprimatur of copyright title to assert priority in considerations of what new rights might be needed to fully exploit the new media to distribute works, while also controlling access and use. 27 Underlying the presumption of authorial ascendancy was a more complex set of ideals that viewed the digital arena as no more than another technological stage that justified copyright status with regard to treating owners as the only indispensable actors in formulating the copyright bargain.
In 177 (1995) , available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf ("Concurrently, copyright owners are developing and implementing technical solutions to facilitate the delivery of protected works in an easy, consumer-friendly yet reliable and secure way. These solutions enable copyright owners not only to protect their works against unauthorized access, reproduction, manipulation, distribution, performance or display, but also serve to assure the integrity of these works and to address copyright management and licensing concerns.").
28. 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) ("The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and expressed .... If no book could be the subject of copy-right which was not new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right in modem times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence."). 81, 104 (1996) .
30. See Litman, supra note 23, Liu, supra note 22, Nowhere is copying more entrenched into copyright than in the context of derivative works.
recognized by courts as "original" enough to warrant protection by copyright. 31 Yet, with the facility of digital technology, copying appeared to have lost any authorial virtue or legal value. Instead, the prospect of mass-scale copying of digital works resurrected the passive image of copyright's audience with ever greater force and inflexibility. The increased autonomy, privacy, secrecy, and ease with which copyrighted works could be used or enjoyed generated immense angst in the entertainment industry, particularly over the security of traditional copyright rights in a digital environment. 32 The author-consumer/ consumer-author spectrum was suppressed in the ensuing forceful discourse over how best to serve the public interest in view of the capacity inherent in digital networks to engender untold nefarious activities with respect to cre~ative works. Domestic efforts in the United States to retool copyright for the digital environment focused almost entirely on how digital technologies could facilitate greater rent from uses of copyrighted works, not on how copyright law might be recalibrated to stimulate creative output, effective dissemination, and user participation in the creative process. Initial proposals were radical at best and outrageously audacious--calling for control by the copyright owner over all digital reproductions of works transmitted over the Internet, even those reproduced in temporary form; 33 elimination of the first-sale doctrine; 34 elimination of fair use when licensing of the work is possible; 35 and giving control to owners over every digital transmission. 36 In addition, there were proposals for technological protection and anticircumvention measures to secure the expanded menu of proposed rights. A. 209, 218 (1983). 31. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976 ) ("'[W]hile a copy of something in the public domain will not, if it be merely a copy, support a copyright, a distinguishable variation will."' (quoting Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927 
See id.
As is well known, the avid efforts to secure large-scale transformation of copyright law for the digital age were not initially successful on the U.S. domestic front, 38 and ultimately the terrain for this great contest became WIPO. 39 There, with the concerted and coordinated efforts of DC negotiators, civil society groups, private industry representatives, and coalitions of scholars, research institutes, and libraries, an ambitious effort to convert all the gains of the digital environment into surplus rent for copyright owners was successfully rolled back-at least for that moment in time. As the years have unfolded, and national implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties has taken distinct twists and turns, the sweet success of the multilateral negotiations has gradually turned sour-at least in some regards-for those who view copyright law as an instrument to be used in pursuit of public ends that contemplate social gains from protection of and access to creative works.
B. Never Too Strong: The Legal Design Context for the WIPO Internet Treaties
As consumer technologies traversed the experiential space between content and access, 40 creative and consumptive processes became inextricably and unavoidably linked, particularly on the Internet, where the line drawing between authors and consumers was bound to be vexatious. 4 ' Yet, copyright's stubborn adherence to the author/consumer paradigm remained adamantly pervasive; the WCT is modeled precisely along this author/consumer axis as though digital networks posed no different possibilities than past technologies, to which copyright responded primarily by recognizing new subject matter and new types of rights for owners. 4 2 Before turning to the substantive provisions of the WIPO Internet Treaties, however, it is important first to describe the international legal framework in which the treaties emerged.
In international copyright parlance, the WIPO Internet Treaties are "special agreements" pursuant to Article 20 of the Berne Convention. of bilateral economic relations between member states, which had been extensive prior to the negotiations for the Berne Convention and which was likely to continue despite the nascent multilateral cooperation evidenced by the convention. 45 Given the minimalist approach to international copyright protection that necessarily characterized the Berme Convention negotiations, 46 countries did not intend to foreclose the possibility of bilateral agreements with higher levels of copyright protection on a reciprocal basis than was afforded by Berne. Accordingly, the Berne Act 4 7 incorporated two provisions to secure the negotiated multilateral baseline for copyright protection. The first was an Additional Article that preserved the legitimacy of existing agreements between member states that already contained rights stronger than those agreed to in the Berne Convention or that were "not contrary to [the] Convention." 4 8 The second provision, contained in Article 15, reiterated the same standard for application to future agreements between Berne signatories, namely, that bilateral "special arrangements" could prospectively be concluded between member states, but only so long as such arrangements conferred stronger rights or terms not contrary to the provisions in the Beme Convention.
For the most part, the strategic and structural importance of these two provisions has been overlooked by scholars and commentators. 49 The addition of these clauses to the design of the multilateral copyright framework effectively foreclosed any legitimate possibility of reimagining international copyright as anything but an ever-increasing strengthening of authors' rights. 50 As a result of these provisions, several countries denounced bilateral agreements that offered less protection than the Berne Convention. 5 1 By 1928, the Berne Convention had been revised twice, with the Berlin Revision of 1908 contributing significantly to a unified codification of international copyright to which most European countries acceded. During the Paris Conference of 1971, with increased substantive harmonization of the Berne Convention, the two provisions were merged into a single provision codified as Article 20.52 It provides,
The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention. The provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these conditions shall remain applicable.
53
Some initial observations should be made here. First, the willingness of states to denounce existing treaty obligations reflects both the moral and political strength of the negotiated commitments under the Berne Convention, particularly given the absence of an enforcement mechanism to secure compliance. 54 Second, the success of the Berne Convention established an intractable momentum toward consolidation of a strong, harmonized multilateral accord for global copyright protection. I have pointed out elsewhere that the laments about a "one-way ratchet" for intellectual property (IP) rights that have followed the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are not only belated, but also underestimate the deliberate architecture of international copyright. The fact is that the legal design of the Berne Convention purposefully exerts a maximalist force over multilateral copyright regulation 55 by, in effect, defining legitimate treaty activities in the copyright realm as only those that unambiguously enhance the rights of authors and owners.
It is important to examine more closely the full import of Article 20. In addition to requiring that "special agreements" do not offer less protection than the minimum established by the Berne Convention, this provision may also impose significant limitations on a state's ability to negotiate treaties over issues not addressed within the Berne Convention. Professor Sam Ricketson has opined that, under Article 20, the right to make or maintain "special agreements" depends upon a threshold assessment of whether the agreement contravenes the provisions of the convention. 56 Thus, agreements dealing with matters ancillary to copyright, such as the regulation of collecting societies, addressing new subject matter for copyright protection, or a protocol on limitations and exceptions, are all arguably subject to the scrutiny of Article 20. 57 Indeed, even the act of negotiating an agreement inconsistent with Article 20 could arguably be a violation of the Berne Convention, 58 as would agreements between members to suspend the operation of the Berne Convention between them, 59 and agreements to modify the obligations of the Berne Convention, or in other ways end run the level of protection afforded under its terms.
60
The result, at least in theory, is that the rights and obligations of the Berne Convention cannot be constricted by mutual agreement between member states or by the operation of international law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). This view of Article 20, if persuasive, would suggest that, in addition to its substantive minima, the Berne Convention also exerts an implicit jurisdictional authority over subject matter that lies beyond the bounds of traditional copyright as reflected in the WIPO Internet Treaties. Thus, notwithstanding the ameliorative outcome of the negotiations, 62 it could be .argued that the treaties can only be viewed as strengthening existing global rights for owners. Even an interpretation maintaining the international status quo would be suspect, although the Agreed Statements to the treaties should effectively counter such an argument. Nevertheless, the ritualistic invocation of Article 20 reflects a long-standing pathological exclusion of copyright (and IP generally) from general principles of public international law. Simply put, the constraints of Article 20 are unnecessary in light of obligations under the Vienna Convention, which has mechanisms designed to (1) ensure that states adhere to existing treaty obligations 6 3 and (2) deal with conflicting treaty obligations. 64 By maintaining Article 20, even if just formally, as the sole authorizing premise for presumptively Berneconsistent copyright agreements, whether or not WIPO-originated, and by further extending its reach to paracopyright subjects, the WIPO Internet Treaties do not go far enough to offer an opportunity to evaluate the Agreement. 75 Technically, such coordination should not extend the reach of TRIPS' interpretations to the WCT; however, the commonality of subject matter and close proximity of the negotiations certainly raise a compelling argument for ensuring consistency between the obligations required by the two agreements. 76 
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[Vol. 77 explicitly incorporated into the WCT as already recognized in the TRIPS Agreement. 85 By and large, these acknowledgments of rights that already existed as a form of international common law do not portend significant shifts in the digital context. 86 In terms of new rights to reflect the impact of digital technologies on the fundamental economics of copyright's core right of reproduction, the WCT recognizes an exclusive right of "making available to the public" originals or copies of works through sales or other means. 87 It also recognizes the exclusive right of authors of computer programs, cinematographic works, and works embodied in phonograms to authorize commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of their works. 88 For these new rights, the term "copies" means only "copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects" to ensure that transient reproductions, such as those automatically generated by computers in Random Access Memory (RAM) modules, are not swept under the ambit of these provisions.
89
The WCT also established an exclusive right of communication to the public. Contained in Article 8, the right of communication to the public covers both print and digital works and includes language that constrains the means and ends of user access to protected works. Owners have the exclusive right to make their works available to the public "in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them."
90
The strong presence of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Online Service Providers (OSPs), and representatives of the telecommunications industry during the WIPO negotiations 9 1 ensured that merely providing technologies or a physical place to access digital content would not run afoul of the new right.
92
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that this tenuous compromise between content and service providers did not resolve the question of whose BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1058 (2007) ("By the end of the multilateral negotiations held at Geneva in 1996, the intense struggle among stakeholders representing content providers, the telecommunications industry, online service providers, and the educational and scientific communities produced a workable compromise in the WCT.").
92. See WCT, supra note 2, art. 8 n.8. During the WCT negotiations, a strong consensus emerged against strict liability for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for copyright infringement. See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 382-92 (discussing the WIPO negotiations on ISP liability).
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presumptive privileges-owners' or users'-should prevail in controlling public engagement with digital content and, more importantly, who should bear the brunt of controlling unauthorized access and use. 93 Despite the basic principle established by WCT Article 8, content providers in Europe have sought tirelessly to direct legislative attention and efforts to mandate greater action by service providers to control users' online activities, 94 while the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 95 in the United States provides a calibrated process or "dance" in which content owners and ISPs play a role in addressing violations of copyright rights. 96 Weary legislators recently appear to see the inefficacy of new laws, instead highlighting the desirability of privately negotiated industry agreements. 97 The claim that "both the WCT and WPPT address the challenges posed by today's digital technologies, in particular the dissemination of protected material over digital networks such as the Intemet," 9 8 now seems quite hollow in light of the increasing complexity of claims arising from new uses, new users, and new works.
Several recent decisions in the United States addressing the right of distribution highlight the marginal role of the WCT in defining user interests in the face of the traditional copyright balance. In Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 9 9 for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota considered the issue of whether making sound recordings available for distribution on a peer-to-peer network qualifies as "distribution" under the 1976 Copyright Act. Rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court held that actual dissemination of copyrighted works, rather than making them available for dissemination through a file-sharing As another indication of recent attempts by courts to recalibrate the presumptions that underlie the use of content in the online environment, the court in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. 1 0 8 held that the DMCA requires a content owner to have a good faith belief that the use of content is not fair use. The plaintiff argued that fair use is a user's right protected by the Copyright Act, a privilege that the defendants reframed as merely a defense. 109 The court ruled that " [t] statute."' 10 Further, the court observed that "[r]equiring owners to consider fair use will help 'ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will expand' without compromising 'the movies, music, software and literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius. ' I II As these cases illustrate, the challenge of digital content ownership is aggravated by the proliferation of consumer technologies and social networking sites, which routinely enable repeated access to and use of digital content such that consumers hardly expect interference with their ability to control, access, and manage an array of works created, shifted, and shared across a versatile set of personal, portable technologies. It is not merely the easy availability of content-laden consumer goods that propels an assumption among users that access, use, and sharing are the prevailing norms of the digital environment but, more significantly, the fact that the social (and increasingly economic) currency of the digital age is explicitly dependent on the network features that characterize most new technologies. So powerful is the salience of interactive platforms as prototypical of the digital age that even the recent struggle over a single platform for highdefinition videos must, at least in part, be understood as implicitly rooted in the compulsion to create technologies that allow users to employ existing content and leverage it across multiple contexts.
12
Despite the express effort to use the WIPO Internet Treaties to "gap fill" the Berne Convention (which did not contain an exclusive right of communication to the public)," 3 the indomitable role of users in enhancing the value of the online world through content creation has in fact produced various efforts to mediate a private compromise between content owners and ISPs/OSPs. The most salient example is the recent collaboration between leading media and content providers that produced a set of guidelines dealing with so-called User Generated Content (UGC).
114 In addition to legislative fatigue, the orientation toward privately negotiated norms to govern the iterative process of creativity in the online world reflects the futility of treating users as external to the creative enterprise, and opens up the possibility of entrenching access principles as a constituent part of the economic models that drive copyright regulation.115 110. Id. at 1156 . 111. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998 [Vol. 77 In this regard, the WIPO Internet Treaties remain imprecise and thus largely irrelevant to the dominant copyright questions facing acceding states today. In obligating states to enhance protection for content providers, but failing to presage the vital role of users in the creative process, the treaties opened up a significant unregulated space in which the major actors-content providers and ISPs-must contend for the creative surplus of the public at large that will help determine the extent of the economic value derived from new technologies. 116
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It would be an overstatement to suggest that the new WCT rights significantly added to the portfolio of claims held by copyright owners. Arguably, existing Berne Convention rights such as the right of reproduction and the right of distribution could have been used to address concerns about granting copyright owners the authority to determine how and when their works could be accessed and used in the online environment.
117 There certainly is no question that the driving principle of the WCT was to give authors the right to control access to and use of their works on digital networks. 1 1 8 However, the new rights were in some ways prematurely recognized given the lack of agreement among states as to the specific form of the right to control digital transmissions and public access to protected works.' 1 9 Today, even within the European Union, a consistent approach to the WCT rights has been frustrated by the failure to acknowledge the role of access rights in construing the precise acts for which a user might have violated the author's legitimate entitlement.' 20 Similarly, in the United States, as noted earlier, several federal district courts have rejected rights holders' requests for relief and ruled that "making available to the public" is not a right recognized under U.S. The standards ultimately agreed to in the WIPO Internet Treaties leave open a range of design possibilities at the national level, 122 a flexibility that, while desirable politically, also cuts against the chief benefits of a global accord on the scope of digital copyright rights. But, in the end, as already discussed, much of the early debates over the scope and form of the WCT rights fell short of addressing the fundamental question of how digital networks and the value that users bring to the table can be harvested to generate the social and economic value that indispensably fuels the digital economy.
III. DISABLING DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
A. Deference and Disharmony
By far, the most significant additions to copyright's traditional legacy are the new rights concerning technological measures 124 and rights management information. 25 Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT are the primary examples of new international rights introduced to "provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by new . . . technological developments."' 26 Article 11 of the WCT expresses the well-known provision requiring protection for anticircumvention measures used by copyright owners in conjunction with the exercise of their legitimate rights. Article 12 is a corollary to this new right, providing for the protection of rights management information. Both of these provisions have been the most controversial aspects of the WCT. The U.S. implementation of these provisions, which adopts an extreme version in the DMCA, 127 has been extended to the multilateral trade environment through a network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which require countries to ratify the WIPO Internet Treaties. 1 28 Indeed, in particularly pernicious forms, some FTAs available" theory as "problematic"); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802-05 (N.D. Cal. 2005 ) (declining to recognize a "making available" theory of copyright infringement because it is contrary to the weight of authority and "inconsistent with the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976"); Arista Records, Inc. v. 
123
. But see Reichman et al., supra note 91 (proposing a "reverse notice and takedown" scheme to address public interest uses).
124. See WPPT, supra note 3, art. 18; WCT, supra note 2, art. go as far as to spell out the precise language of obligations, which typically mirrors the language of the DMCA.
129
Since the Berne Convention authorizes protection stronger than any minimum terms set forth in the treaty or related special agreements, this globalization of the DMCA is, in theory, compatible with the Berne framework. However, neither adoption of the DMCA model nor ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties has established a global harmonized baseline for technological protection measures (TPMs) or anticircumvention legislation.
130
The WCT thus accomplished a remarkable feat: a global treaty was negotiated not to harmonize various national approaches to a particular copyright issue, but rather to create a framework in which states could choose to live in disharmony-to provide specific rights within their domestic copyright laws without any concomitant obligations to attend to the often touted benefits of harmonization.
The WCT goes even further. Beyond encouraging states to exercise national policy prerogatives in implementing its obligations, the WCT also contemplates that such implementation can be accomplished using noncopyright regimes such as unfair competition laws, 131 which are nonexistent in most DCs and LDCs.
B. National Implementation of the WCT/WPPT
In 2003, WIPO conducted a survey of thirty-nine member states that had acceded to or ratified either or both the WCT and the WPPT prior to April 1, 2003.132 Of the countries surveyed, only Japan and the United States are considered "developed" countries. 11, 20 & n.40 (2005) ("It is worth noting that the WCT does not require that protections for technological measures be enacted as part of national copyright laws; that certainly is one route, but so too are sui generis laws or inclusion of protections within the scope of more general laws, such as those addressing unfair competition .... For example, Japan has divided coverage of technological measures between the copyright law and the unfair competition law. Australia has done this solely within the provisions of its 1968 Copyright Act but makes them the subject of separate rights of action that may be brought by the copyright owner." (citations omitted)); see also WIPO Standing Comm. on Copyright & Related Rights, Survey on Implementation Provisions of the WCT and the WPPT, WIPO Doc. SCCR/9/6 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter WIPO, Implementation Survey], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr 9/sccr 9 6.pdf (providing an overview of the methods individual member states have utilized to implement the WIPO Internet Treaties and highlighting the diversity among them).
132. The countries surveyed were Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Republic of Moldova, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United States. See WIPO, Implementation Survey, supra note 131.
133. See id.
contracting parties, more than half of which joined the WCT in 2002 and the majority of which are DCs and LDCs. 134 Indeed, if judged solely by the acceding countries, the WIPO Internet Treaties reflect a drastic change from the concert of countries that negotiated the Berne Convention over a century ago. Where the Berne Convention countries were all European with fairly similar levels of socioeconomic development, the WCT contracting parties were mainly DCs and LDCs whose combined gross domestic product (GDP) represents a mere fraction of that of their developed country counterparts. 1 35 The survey results reflect significant consistency between developed countries and DCs/LDCs in the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties' provisions in national laws, including limitations and exceptions.1 36 This may quickly be attributed to WIPO's role in providing technical assistance in implementing the treaties to the latter group of countries.
However, national implementation of anticircumvention measures and the obligation to protect rights management information were highly inconsistent. 137 Countries that provided protection against anticircumvention did so under a variety of legal means, ranging from criminal law to unfair competition law. 1 38 In some laws, only acts of circumvention were prohibited, while preparatory acts or making equipment available were prohibited in others. 13 9 Similar variations were evident in the implementation of Article 12 relating to digital rights management (DRM).
140
As mentioned earlier, the variety of implementation models with respect to Articles 11 and 12 reflects the important flexibility in the global obligations contained in the WCT 14 1 and an unusual deference to the 134. See WCT Contracting Parties, supra note 4.
135.
As revealed by analysis of World Bank data, in 2007, the combined real GDP of developing countries (DCs) and least-developed countries (LDCs) party to the WCT was roughly twenty percent of the combined real GDP of developed WCT members. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 14-16 (2007 national design of digital copyright. Despite a standard that could be tilted solely in favor of owners, national laws in developed countries can and have implemented these obligations in ways that reflect deliberate policy choices and nuances that calibrate a variety of domestic interests at stake.
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The core principle of anticircumvention, for example, designed to secure the economic interests (primarily) of owners, should yield not only to the reality of coordinated technologies that conform to modem lifestyles, but also to changed expectations of users about what such technology presumptively entitles them to do.
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Without question, U.S. implementation of the anticircumvention and DRM obligations 144 has engendered significant controversy both domestically and globally, 145 and important attention has been directed at the negative effects of the DMCA in the domestic U.S. market. The impact of TPMs on access to digital content has also been noted by WIPO as being of great concern to DCs and LDCs.
146 As I explore briefly in the following section, the extent of these concerns is important because, in the current global economic context, these countries have little to gain from the WIPO Internet Treaties and, by many accounts, have much to lose by the design choices made during domestic implementation of the treaties in developed countries. Importantly (or perhaps ironically), DCs and LDCs, who typically agitate for less substantive harmonization and greater domestic flexibility in IP matters, have now received it in an area in which the exercise of such flexibility has little meaning for development policy goals. PROP. REv. 431, 431-32 (1996) (noting differences between the WCT and U.S implementation of its provisions).
142. Gasser, supra note 122, at 66-9 3 ; Wang, supra note 137, at 230-35 (comparing scope of protection of anticircumvention provisions in Japan, Australia, the European Union, and the United States).
143. 1l.pdf ("The ongoing controversy surrounding the use of technological protection measures in the digital environment is also of great concern. The provisions of any treaties in this field must be balanced and clearly take on board the interests of consumers and the public at large. It is important to safeguard the exceptions and limitations existing in the domestic laws of Member States. In order to tap into the development potential offered by the digital environment, it is important to bear in mind the relevance of open access models for the promotion of innovation and creativity.").
C. Participation by Developing and Least-Developed Countries in the WCT and WPPT Framework
With China's accession to the WCT on March 9, 2007,147 the vast majority of the world's population has become subject to the digital copyright regime. Despite its application to a global audience whose citizens live well below the global poverty level, the stark reality is that digital copyright has yet to fully impact most citizens of DCs and LDCs. The premature ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties is thus troubling where these regions are concerned. Over 18% of the countries that ratified the WCT are in Africa.
148 Africa is estimated to hold 14.2% of the world's population,1 49 but only 5.6% of the population has access to the Internet.15 0 Asia represents 60.5% of the world's population, 15 1 but only 17.2% of the population has Internet access. 152 In Latin America and the Caribbean, which comprise 8.6% of the world's population, 153 only 28.6% of the population has Internet access.
154 For all practical purposes, then, the vast majority of the population in these countries cannot make any significant use of digital works, and, arguably, the WIPO Internet Treaties are even less relevant to these countries than traditional copyright agreements.
If, as I argued earlier, the treaties do not enhance incentives for creativity in general, and if infrastructure needs render them mostly immaterial for most of the world's population, in what ways have copyright goals been meaningfully advanced either for users or owners anywhere by the proliferation of digital copyright obligations? More importantly, why was it important for DCs and LDCs to ratify the treaties? 155 Since the entry into force of both treaties, not a single DC or LDC has had reason to experiment with their provisions domestically, nor have the domestic laws implementing the treaties ever been invoked before a domestic court. This observation of limited national experience is certainly not limited to the WIPO Internet Treaties, but it does point to the extreme improbability that DCs and LDCs can exercise effective design choices at the national level. Even if so, there is a question whether such investments can be justified in the absence of sophisticated institutions to develop and sustain a publicinterest balance in the deployment of TPMs locally. Nevertheless, three Assimilating DCs and LDCs into the global copyright system is a familiar component of the path dependency characteristic of global copyright lawmaking. Since the Stockholm Protocol, which first formally acknowledged special needs of DCs, 156 no other revision of the Berne Convention or associated special treaty has purposively sought to identify the impact of new provisions on the development needs and aspirations of the global South beyond general statements regarding the "balance" evidenced by the formal language of the treaties. 157 Instead, the justifications for "globalizing copyright" have sought to impute benefits deeply linked to and dependent on the existence of capital markets and institutional actors to copyright regulation in the impoverished and unstable economies of much of the Southern Hemisphere. In the context of the WIPO Internet Treaties, DC and LDC participation has been specifically justified in ways that echo disputed, untested, and at times inapplicable (but as yet historically pervasive) rationalizations for the internationalization of IP more generally. These include, most notably, benefits of technology transfer, foreign direct investment, stimulation of domestic creativity and innovation, and general development progress. However, none of these claims have been proven in the experience of most DCs and LDCs, and there is some consensus that the relationship between IP and development is much more complex than the claims suggest. Indeed, it is instructive to compare official justifications for DC and LDC participation in the WIPO Internet Treaties with concerns articulated by these countries in the proposal for a WIPO Development Agenda. With respect to the possibility of foreign technology transfers, the proposal states,
The transfer of technology has been identified as an objective that intellectual property protection should be supportive of and not run counter to, as stated in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, many of the developing countries and LDCs that have taken up higher IP obligations in recent years simply lack the necessary infrastructure and institutional capacity to absorb such technology.
Even in developing countries that may have a degree of absorptive technological capacity, higher standards of intellectual property protection have failed to foster the transfer of technology through foreign direct investment and licensing. In effect, corrective measures are needed to address the inability of existing IP agreements and treaties to promote a real transfer of technology to developing countries and LDCs. 158 Yet, according to a WIPO document outlining the advantages of adherence to the WCT and WPPT,1 59 digital copyright protection will encourage investment in the country, both domestic and foreign, by providing greater certainty to businesses that their property can be safely disseminated there.
The level of intellectual property protection and enforcement is very much a factor in industry's decisions to invest in any particular country. Companies evaluate the likelihood that they will sell enough legitimate copies of the products-in light of local intellectual property protection. It does not make sense for investors to put money into a market where they will not recover their investment and generate a reasonable profit. For copyrighted products, this depends almost entirely on the level of copyright protection. Adherence to the treaties makes a strong statement of the country's commitment to copyright protection and readiness to respond to technological change. 160 Another stated advantage of the WIPO Internet Treaties includes the protection in developed countries of works by local creators and enterprises from DCs and LDCs, which ensures "that [these] creators and enterprises enjoy the economic rewards from outside the country."
16 1 Yet, recently, a major Indian filmmaker noted the failure of U.S. authorities to crack down on U.S. sales of home videos of movies made in India.
162 Indeed, it is hardly likely that enforcement of foreign rights in developed countries represents any meaningful concern for authorities in those countries. 163 Further, claims that "jobs all over the world" are created by copyright industries, "not just for developed countries, but also for developing countries and for many related economic sectors that contribute to manufacturing, sales and service of these products"' 64 simply are not borne out by existing empirical evidence or the conclusions of leading economists.' 6 5 Neither is the claim that copyright industries can make significant contributions to the economies of developing countries. In short, other than the enactment of implementing legislation, there is no evidence of local engagement with the WIPO Internet Treaties in DCs and LDCs, much less any evidence to verify these assertions.
Even with respect to benefits that might inure to developed countries, such as the enhancement of technology markets and e-commerce, the stated official justifications are simply facile. Technology markets in IP have been stymied for a variety of reasons that include a reliance on the right to exclude use as a dominant model. 166 In Europe, where considerable substantive harmonization has occurred since the 1990s, there remain considerable challenges to the development of a robust internal market for online works. 1 67 
The Accountability Deficit
Claims that strong protection for IP will ineluctably produce positive development gains in the global South systematically underestimate and undervalue the importance of access to knowledge and technology as part of a necessary global bargain to facilitate consumer creativity and contribute to development aspirations. Similarly, resting the development challenge solely at the feet of a flawed global IP system falls far short of confronting the significant infrastructural shortcomings of many DCs and LDCs, which makes harnessing IP rights (balanced or not) for development a truly difficult task. Nevertheless, the fact that DCs and LDCs are somehow successfully persuaded to ratify major IP treaties suggests that there is some capacity at the global institutional level to influence the direction of IP regulation in the global South. Arguments presented systematically by private actors, developed countries, and even WIP0 168 that new rights and regimes offer development benefits to DCs and LDCs require regulatory space to address, on a global front, the access needs that are most relevant to leveraging technology for development gains in areas ranging from bulk access to educational materials to distance learning.' 69 There should be corresponding accountability by WIPO and developed countries for the negative effects of heightened copyright standards and, importantly, attention directed at redressing the lack of corresponding minimum limitations and exceptions in the global copyright scheme that now includes the WIPO Internet Treaties. This lack of accountability for the claims that, when leveraged, have historically encouraged DC and LDC ratification of IP treaties, have contributed to a political and institutional global culture in which the needs of DCs and LDCs are often framed as illegitimate attempts to undermine the economic value of IP rights. If such value is not dispersed among all signatory countries, there can be nothing illegitimate about demands that the system be examined to determine its impact on the aspirations of the majority of treaty members.
Considerations of Private Enforcement
To the extent consumers in the global South are far less vulnerable to the enforcement processes of developed countries, the legitimacy and efficacy of technological controls become far more important to content providers whose reliance on private enforcement will likely be far greater across territorial lines. Ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties by DCs and LDCs was thus important not necessarily to obligate these countries to new copyright standards as such, but, instead, as a means for content providers to circumvent reliance on domestic institutions in those countries in enforcing their rights-whether or not such rights are consistent with the domestic choices of treaty implementation.
Put differently, the technological protection controls legitimized in the WIPO Internet Treaties not only trivialize the possibility that users in the global South might actually engender value in the global networks, but could also render the dominance of national copyright laws a nullity. In international fora, demands by DCs and LDCs that global copyright regulation must reflect and be accountable to broader economic and social goals have engendered new action programs and initiatives, 173 while an active and engaged civil society network steadfastly resists the unfettered expansion of IP rights more generally.
The tendency of global copyright regulation to marginalize the publicinterest priorities that make copyright law both necessary and relevant is evident in the compromises that yielded the WIPO Internet Treaties. After more than a decade, neither developed countries nor DCs/LDCs appear to have benefited uniquely from the hard-fought battle over the appropriate role of copyright in the digital age; instead, there appears to be only increasing regulatory space for private lawmaking to occur 174 as the best means to appropriate copyright's goals within the contested arena of global digital networks. This might suggest that the real danger of the WIPO Internet Treaties is not that they strengthen private copyright interests, but that they make public copyright regulation less meaningful. At best, it would appear that the WIPO Internet Treaties offered too little too early and, consequently, serve a more technocratic and political-rather than substantive and legal-role in the future of digital copyright.
CONCLUSION
The importance of copyright's attention to users has been evident since the first copyright law of modem history. as did the federal scheme that has evolved since the late nineteenth century. At no time was copyright law ever conceived or designed as the exclusive repository of authorial interests. 178 Instead, copyright law mediated internal tensions between the creative experiences of authors writing over the shoulders of giants, 179 and of readers or other kinds of users whose interaction with the subjects of copyright generated a diffuse but important social value. Art, music, and literature were not only casual entertainment, but modes of cultural dialogue, critical commentary, reflections on social and political conditions, and opportunities to express life in invariable dimensions. The creative and the consumptive processes were inextricable and unalterably linked, even if not explicitly structured through the early canons of copyright regulation. The new rights introduced by the WIPO Internet Treaties threatened to redirect the social value of the copyright system away from diffusion to containment. But, ultimately, they cannot alter or overcome the creative engagement of users whose interests are critical to the capacity of owners and technology suppliers to appropriate value from technological innovation.
